Florida Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 9

December 1963

Constitutional Law: Associational Privacy Afforded to Legitimate
Organizations Notwithstanding Subversive Infiltration
Gerald F. Richman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerald F. Richman, Constitutional Law: Associational Privacy Afforded to Legitimate Organizations
Notwithstanding Subversive Infiltration, 16 Fla. L. Rev. 493 (1963).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

CASE Law:
COMMENTS
Richman: Constitutional
Associational Privacy Afforded to Legitimate

of the General Motors case and of the minority in the second hearing;
(2) that the two cases turned on the same issue and were decided
on the same day in opinions written by the same justice; and (3) that
this argument is too obvious and too meritorious simply to have been
overlooked. After all, since the verbal formulae of the section 8(a)
(3) proviso and section 14(b) are substantially identical, it is certainly not unreasonable to conclude that when a state passes a rightto-work law under the authority of section 14(b), it effectively
obliterates the operation of the union shop proviso to section 8(a)
(3). 27
Though the opinions handed down in the Schermerhorn and
General Motors cases thus seem to pose interesting possibilities for
the study of judicial decision-making, it should be pointed out that
the impact of the Schermerhorn holding will generally be limited to
the less industrially-advanced states that have right-to-work laws.
However, its impact in those states will be increased to the extent
that the same climate of opinion that produced the right-to-work laws
will usually result in their being construed by the state courts as
prohibiting the agency shop. The net result will obviously be in the
direction of weakening union security.
ERNS

E. MEANs

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ASSOCIATIONAL PRIVACY
AFFOBDED TO LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATIONS NOTWITHSTANDING SUBVERSIVE INFILTRATION
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 83 Sup.
Ct. 889 (1968)
Petitioner, president of the Miami Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was adjudged in
contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena duces tecum that
required him to produce the association's membership lists. Use of
27. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno
Stage Line, Inc., supra note 13, at 729: "If we compare the language of the
proviso to Section 8(a) (3) with the provisions of Section 14(b), we see that the
latter section gives to the states the power to render inoperative the proviso to the
former section."
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the lists was to be confined to petitioner's references thereto as the
basis of his testimony affirming or denying the membership of specified
persons, alleged communists, in the association. Petitioner volunteered
to answer such questions on the basis of his own personal knowledge (a hollow offer since the association had over 1,000 members),
but claimed that production of the lists would violate the rights of
associational privacy of present and future members of the association.
The Supreme Court of Florida, holding (1) that once an individual is
identified as a subversive his right of associational privacy is superseded by the public interest,1 and (2) that the suggested method of
inquiry involved would sufficiently protect other members of the
association,2 affirmed the conviction. 3 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, HELD, the legislative committee failed to
show a sufficient nexus between the association and communist activities to justify compelled disclosure of the membership of even
specified individuals. Judgment reversed, Justices Harlan, Clark,
Stewart, and White dissenting, Justices Black and Douglas, concurring
separately.
The right of associational privacy or anonymity, 4 based on the freedoms of speech and assembly,5 has been repeatedly upheld by the
United States Supreme Court 6 subject, however, to abridgment by
the government where there exists a subordinating compelling interest 7 sufficient to justify the deterrent effect such membership dis8
closure may have upon both the members and the organization itself.
Organizations, such as the Communist Party, that are involved in
subversive activities, may be subjected to legislative investigation and
forced disclosure since they are recognized as a threat to national
security and thus meet the "compelling interest" requirement.10
1. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 129, 132-33
(Fla. 1960), rev'd, 83 Sup. Ct. 889 (1963). Accord, Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
2. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 129, 132
(Fla. 1960).
3. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 129 (Fla.
1960).
4. Note, 86 Im. L.J. 306, 308 (1961).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
6. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
8. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
9. Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
10. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 70
(1961). See generally Note, 15 U. FLA. L. 1Ev. 435 (1962).
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Individuals may be compelled to reveal their membership in subversive organizations' but may invoke the personal protection of
the first amendment as to any question concerning membership in
legitimate organizations. In a companion case, Graham v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee,12 the Florida Supreme Court
itself reiterated this personal right by reversing a contempt conviction for refusal to answer the question "Are you a member of
N.A.A.C.P.?"' 3 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
contempt conviction in Gibson, distinguishing it from Graham on the
grounds that the fourteen N.A.A.C.P. members in Gibson were
actually accused of being subversives, and the investigation was not
limited solely to an inquiry into the membership of a legitimate
organization. In reversing Gibson, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the method approved by the Florida court could
subject any organization, no matter how concededly legitimate its
activities are,14 to legislative harassment if even an insignificant percentage of its members also happen to be communists. The freedoms
of speech and assembly are protected "not only against heavy-handed
frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference."' 5 There is no evidence nor even an allegation by
the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee in Gibson that the
fourteen alleged communists were active in the organization or in any
way dominated or influenced its policies.' 6
To allow the method of forced disclosure approved by the Florida
court in Gibson would erode the right of free association, for one
could deny his membership in a legitimate but unpopular organization
in the community, and still be disclosed as a member by use of a
subpoena duces tecumn to its president under the guise of alleged
communism. Although a procedural safeguard could be instituted
with reference to individuals, such as requiring a minimal quantum
of evidence as to the person's subversive activities before his rights
may be abridged by the committee, none presently exists. However,
even with such safeguards, the practical effect is that the organization
itself, despite the legitimacy of its activities, is subjected to adverse
publicity and censure merely because some of its members are also
7
communists.1
11. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
12. 126 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 1960).
13. Id. at 135.
14. The Supreme Court of Florida recognized the legitimacy of the N.A.A.C.P.
in Graham v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., supra note 12, at 136.
15. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 52S (1960).
16. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 126 So. 2d 129 (Fla.

1960).
17. Cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
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When the organization is adversely publicized by disclosure of the
activities of some of its members, the likely result will be loss of
finances and membership.' 8 Since an organization such as the
N.A.A.C.P. is primarily a medium for expression of the views of its
members, 19 the members must also collectively suffer when the organization is thus weakened. Adequate protection of the members therefore can only be accomplished by protection of the organization itself,
and this in turn is best accomplished by recognition of the application
of the right of privacy to such organization. In controversies involving
the right of associational privacy prior to Gibson, the Court looked to
the assertion of individual rights 20 or the standing of the organization to
assert the collective rights of its members. 21 In Gibson, the Court for
the first time applied the concept of associational privacy to a specific
organization rather than to specified or collective individuals.2 2
To protect both the individual and the organization from subtle
harassment, the Court further required that the legislative committee
show more than a mere assertion of a "compelling interest"23 or purpose2 4 as the basis for disclosure of the membership list. Rather, there
must be some demonstration25 that the organization itself is involved
in activities serious enough to justify disclosure of membership. This
requirement of a nexus 26 between the organization and the subversive
activities was not met by the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee in Gibson.
The Court correctly clarifies the right of associational privacy as
extending not merely to the individual, but to the investigated organization itself, and requires a showing by extrinsic evidence that
such organization is involved in subversive activities before it can be
subjected to any membership disclosure whatsoever. Even actual
evidence of some infiltration into a racial relations organization by
18. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958).
19. Id. at 459.
20. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
21. In upholding the propriety of the association itself to assert the right of
associational privacy, the Court stated that the N.A.A.C.P. and its members "are
in every practical sense identical." N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra
note 19, at 459.
22. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 83 Sup. Ct. 889, 899
(1963).
23.

See text at notes 7 and 10 supra.

24. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra note 19, at 465, where
the asserted purpose was held insufficient.
25. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 861 U.S. 516, 527 (1960); Louisiana ex rel.
Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., 181 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 366 U.S.
293 (1961).
26. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959).
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